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Enjoining Politically Motivated Strikes
in Federal Courts:
The Jacksonpille Bulk Terminals Case
The United States Supreme Court, in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc.
v. International Longshoremen's Association, acknowledged that a work
stoppage entirely motivated by political goals constitutes a "labor dis-
pute" within the Norris-La Guardia Act which is prohibited from injunc-
tive relief by a federal court. In so ruling, the Supreme Court found the
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union and Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO exceptions, which allow an injunction
to issue pending arbitration in situations where the dispute underlying the
work stoppage is arbitrable, to be inapplicable to the no-strike clause in
the collective-bargaining agreement scrutinized. The case represents a vic-
tory for labor while leaving the employer in the precarious position of hav-
ing "bargained for" no-strike clauses which are ineffective. The author
delineates the extent of labor's victory and presents the options available
for management.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshore-
men's Association,' the Supreme Court considered the authority
of a federal court to enjoin a politically motivated work stoppage.
An employer commenced the action pursuant to section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)2 seeking not only to
enforce the union's obligations under a collective bargaining
agreement, but also to enjoin the boycott pending an arbitrator's
decision concerning whether the strike violated the aforemen-
tioned agreement.
The Court addressed two distinct issues in its attempt to delin-
eate the boundaries of federal court authority in this particular
area. Initially, the Court addressed whether broad anti-injunction
1. 102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982).
2. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a) (1976), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), al-
lows federal jurisdiction for violations of collective bargaining agreements and
provides:
(a) Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
Id.
policies stated in section four of the Norris-La Guardia Act
(NLA)3 apply to politically motivated work stoppages. Second, if
these policies do apply, it considered whether such work stop-
pages may be enjoined by a federal court under the rationale of
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union 4 and Buffalo Forge Co.
v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO.5
The case is another in a series of cases 6 where the Supreme
Court was forced to accommodate the LMRA7 with the NLA.8
The Court was again called upon to harmonize the policy favoring
the arbitration process, 9 with the policy discouraging the use of
injunctions in labor disputes. Acknowledging that the broad anti-
injunction provisions of the NLA apply to politically motivated
work stoppages, the Supreme Court, in Jacksonville Bulk Termi-
nals, held that the work stoppage could not be enjoined under the
3. Norris-La Guardia Act § 4 (1976), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976) reads as follows:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involv-
ing or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein de-
fined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment;
Id. However, the injunction ban is not absolute. Norris-La Guardia Act § 7, 29
U.S.C. § 107 (1976), authorizes the issuance of injuctions after hearings are held,
with appropriate notice to affected persons, and findings of fact made by the court.
These findings of fact must generally show: that unlawful acts have or will be
committed; that irreparable injury to complainant's property will result; that the
greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of the relief than
will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief; that there is no ade-
quate remedy at law; and that the public officers in charge with the duty to protect
a complainant's property are unable or unwilling to provide adequate protection.
A temporary restraining order (effective for no longer than five days), however,
may be issued without notice if substantial and irreparable injury will be unavoid-
able in the absence of such restraining order. See Marine Cooks & Stewards v.
Panama Steamship Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960). Note, however, that since section 4
prohibits the issuance of an injunction, mere compliance with the procedures of
§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976), will not be sufficient to allow the injunction to issue.
Section 8, 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1976) places further restrictions on the issuance of an
injunction. Any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation im-
posed by law or who has failed to pursue each channel of peaceful settlement (i.e.,
negotiation, mediation and arbitration) will not be granted injunctive relief. Com-
pliance with some but not all of the criteria will be insufficient even though the
section is phrased in the disjunctive. Brotherhood of RR Trainmen Enterprise,
Lodge 27 v. Toledo P & W RR, 321 U.S. 50, 60 (1944).
4. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
5. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
6. See infra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-146, 171-197 (1976). See supra note 2.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). See supra note 3.
9. This policy was enunciated in what has become known as the Steel-
worker's Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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Boys Markets exception, pending an arbitrator's determination of
the boycott's legality. Inlreaching this conclusion, the Court ac-
knowledged that a work stoppage, even when entirely motivated
by political goals, constitutes a "labor dispute" within the NLA.
The Court further found that congressional intent prohibited such
strikes from being enjoined by federal courts. At the same time,
the Court also found that Congress intended to give federal courts
jurisdiction of collective bargaining agreement violations via the
LMRA..
Although the necessity of accommodating the two acts looms
heavily in the Supreme Court's analysis of this area of labor law,
the Court did not seem to rest its decision on an accommodation
theory. Instead, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals represents a tre-
mendous victory for labor in that it reestablishes the authority of
the NLA and at the same time refuses to broaden the LMRA.
Furthermore, the case leaves employers in the precarious posi-
tion of having "bargained for" no-strike clauses which are ineffec-
tive. It is the extent of labor's victory and the options remaining
for management which this note will analyze.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 4, 1980, President Carter, in response to the Soviet
Union's invasion of Afghanistan, issued specific directives, pursu-
ant to the Export Administration Act,10 implementing an embargo
on exports to the Soviet Union." Imports, however, were not af-
fected by the embargo. On January 9, 1980, the International
Longshoremen's Association (ILA) announced that all local un-
ions on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts were to boycott any cargo
bound to or coming from the Soviet Union.12 Thus, the ILA boy-
cott was much broader than the Presidential directive. This boy-
10. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2040 (1976 & Supp. I1, 1979).
11. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
102 S. Ct. 2673, 2677 (1982).
12. International President of the ILA, Thomas W. Gleason, made the follow-
ing announcement:
In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of
the Union, the leadership of the ILA today ordered immediate suspension
in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine
to Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed.
This order is effective across the board on all vessels and all cargoes.
Grain and other foods as well as high valued general freight. However,
cott was purely a political protest of the Soviet aggression.13
Economic gain was not the stimulus for the boycott, and the
union employees had no specific dispute with any particular em-
ployer. Furthermore, the ILA did not seek or solicit any action
from the "employer of union members and nothing that these em-
ployers might do could have eliminated the cause of the
boycott."14
On January 15, 1980, several Norwegian vessels entered the
shipping terminal of Jacksonville Bulk Terminals [JBT] in the
Port of Jacksonville, Florida to take on cargo for transport to the
Soviet Union.15 JBT is a party to the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the Jacksonville Maritime Association and several
local unions affiliated with the ILA. The collective bargaining
agreement between JBT and Local 1408 contains both a no-strike
clause 16 and an arbitration provision for the resolution of all
disputes.17
any Russian ship now in process of loading or discharging at a waterfront
will be worked until completion.
The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international
events that have affected relations between the U.S. & Soviet Union.
However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by
the demands of the workers.
It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes
under present conditions of the world.
People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual pol-
icy as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a
decision in which the Union leadership concurs.
Brief for Respondents at 2, n.2, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982).
13. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
626 F.2d 455, 459 (5th Cir. 1980).
14. Id.
15. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
102 S. Ct. 2673, 2677 n.3 (1982). The corporate structure, of which JBT is a part, is
as follows: JBT is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Oxy Chemical Corporation, which
is a subsidiary of Hooker Chemical Corporation. Ownership of all these cor-
porations is ultimately vested in Occidental Petroleum Company. Hooker Chemi-
cal Company manufactures superphosphoric acid (SPA) at a manufacturing
facility in Florida. Pursuant to a bilateral trade agreement between Occidental
and the Soviet Union, SPA is shipped to the Soviet Union from the JBT facility in
Jacksonville. Id. at 2677 n.3.
16. The no-strike clause provides:
During the term of this Agreement .... the Union agrees there shall not
be any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever, ... for any cause whatso-
ever; such causes including but not limited to, unfair labor practices by
the Employer or violation of this Agreement. The right of employees not
to cross a bona fide picket line is recognized by the Employer....
Id. at 2678.
17. The Agreement establishes that:
Matters under dispute which cannot be promptly settled between the Lo-
cal and an individual Employer shall ... be referred... to a Port Griev-
ance Committee .... In the event (this) Committee is unable to reach a
majority decision within 72 hours after meeting to discuss the case, it shall
employ a professional arbitrator ....
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Pursuant to the national ILA resolution, the members of Local
1408 refused to transport the cargo onto the Norwegian vessels.
JBT, seeking to compel arbitration and requesting a temporary re-
straining order and a prelimiary injunction to halt the boycott, in-
itiated an action pursuant to section 301(a) of the LMRA.18 The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida or-
dered the union to process any grievance in accordance with the
procedure contained in the arbitration clause of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.' 9 The court also enjoined the union from re-
fusing to load the Norwegian vessels.20 Subsequently, the vessels
were loaded by the affiliated members of the ILA and left
Jacksonville. 21
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on United States
Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers,22 reiterated that a strike
Id. at 2677-78 n.4.
18. Id. at 2677; see supra note 2.
19. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
626 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 1980).
20. Id.
21. Thereafter, the International Trade Administration of the Department of
Commerce changed the regulations governing the exportation of phosphoric acid,
effective February 4, 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 8293 (1980) (requiring validated
licenses to ship phosphate to the U.S.S.R., rather than general licenses which were
previously required).
On February 25, 1980, President Carter extended the trade embargo of January 4
to include SPA. On April 24, 1981, President Reagan lifted the SPA embargo as
part of his decision to resume the sale of grain to the Soviet Union. On April 24,
1981 and June 5, 1981, the leadership of the ILA recommended that its affiliate lo-
cal unions resume handling goods bound to or coming from the Soviet Union. 102
S. Ct. at 2677 n.1.
22. 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), rehearing denied, 526 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976). The case involved the "national policy of this country's
permitting the importation of South African coal." Id. at 1247. The court recog-
nized that United States Steel had a remedy for a secondary boycott through a Na-
tional Labor Relations Board § 10(1) injunction, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970), or a Taft-
Hartley § 303 damage suit under the National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (4), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970). Id. at 1247 n.23. However, the court refused to allow an
injunction on a Boys Markets theory. The Court maintained it was beyond belief
that the parties intended to arbitrate the issue of the importation of South African
coal. Id. at 1247. The Fifth Circuit noted that the United States Steel Corp. deci-
sion, rendered on September 24, 1975, was apparently inconsistent with the deci-
sion rendered shortly thereafter in West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. ILA, 413 F. Supp.
372 (S.D. Tex. 1975), affd summarily, 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976). In West Gulf
Maritime Association the district court held that the underlying dispute involved
a political issue which was not a "labor dispute" within the purview of § 4 of the
NLA. 413 F. Supp. at 375. The Fifth Circuit, recognizing the inconsistency of the
two decisions stated:
The possibility of such a regrettable occurrence appears to lurk continu-
ally in the proceedings of a multi-panel court for it is difficult to devise a
called to further the political goals of the union involved or grew
out of a labor dispute within the meaning of the NLA.23 The
Court reasoned that a Boys Markets injunction could be issued
only if the strike were over a dispute between the union and the
employer that was subject to the arbitration provisions of the con-
tract. According to the Fifth Circuit, the "crucial distinction is
whether arbitration would resolve the dispute [which] led to the
strike."24
The circuit court rationalized that in the JBT situation no arbi-
trator could resolve the grievance between the ILA and the Soviet
Union. While the district court was correct in compelling arbitra-
tion of whether or not the work stoppage violated the no-strike
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, the injunction
granted, pending the arbitrator's decision, went beyond the
Court's power.25 In this respect, the Fifth Circuit refused to
broaden the exception carved out by Boys Markets.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
When Congress passed the Clayton Act on October 15, 1914,26 it
viewed the Act as a "red letter day for labor." The Clayton Act
exempted peaceful labor activities from the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act27 which prohibited unlawful trusts or conspiracies in restraint
of trade. 28 It soon became apparent that the Clayton Act did not
process that will expose the similarity of issues in pending cases before
decisions are published. . . . To the extent that they are inconsistent, we
consider the rationale of United States Steel Corp. to be more persuasive.
626 F.2d at 465. The Supreme Court cited the United States Steel Corp. decision as
being "in accord" with the Second Circuit decision affirmed by the Supreme Court
in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976). Id. at 303 n.9. See
infra note 72 and accompanying text.
23. 626 F.2d at 465.
24. Id. at 467.
25. Id.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976). See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
28. 75 CONG. REc. 5488 (1932). Senator Celler suggests that labor unions were
originally believed to be exempt from the interdict of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
He states:
At this point, it is interesting to note, that on March 25, 1890, Senator Sher-
man proposed a proviso excluding labor and farm organizations from the
terms of the act. Although this proviso was agreed to in the Committee of
the Whole, it was omitted when the bill was again reported out of the com-
mittee to the floor of the Senate. And the Congressional Record does not
disclose whether the proviso was omitted because of opposition to it, or
because of the belief that the act itself so clearly excluded labor that the
proviso was unnecessary. In any event, the speeches of Senator Hoar,
Twenty-First Congressional Record, page 2729; of Senator Stewart, ibidem,
page 2606; and of Senator Teller, ibidem, page 2562, seem to imply that the
proviso was unnecessary, and that labor unions were not to be deemed as
combinations in restraint of trade.
Id.
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bring about the immunization of labor organizations from prose-
cution or suit under the anti-trust laws. Through the issuance of
injunctions, federal courts were converted into strike-breaking
agencies, and, on numerous occasions, even unjustifiably enjoined
peaceful strike activity. "Labor's so-called bill of rights became a
mere shambles."29
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering3 O is an example of the
manner in which the courts had narrowly construed the Clayton
Act's labor exemption from the Sherman Act's prohibition against
conspiracies to restrain trade. The Supreme Court held that the
Clayton Act only restricted the use of injunctions in favor of the
immediate disputants and that other members of the union not
standing in the proximate relation of employer and employee
could be enjoined. As Congress was to later note, "[oif course, it
is fundamental that a strike is generally an idle gesture if con-
fined only to the immediate disputants."31
In response, Congress, in 1932, reevaluated the equitable juris-
diction of federal courts and enacted the NLA.32 The NLA specifi-
cally addressed Duplex Printing Press by broadening the
definition of a person participating in a labor dispute to include
others than the immediate disputants. One of the Act's most im-
portant provisions prohibited federal courts from issuing injunc-
tions in labor disputes against employees who cease or refuse to
work. Section 13(c) of the NLA broadly defined the term "labor
29. Id.
30. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
31. H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1932).
32. 75 Cong. Rec. 5478 (1932). Congressman La Guardia stated:
If the courts had not emasculated and purposely misconstrued the Clay-
ton Act, we would not today be discussing an anti-injunction bill. The
trouble is that a few - and I am glad to say a few - Federal judges seek-
ing to curry favor, social or other, trying to play up to men they considered
financially powerful, were willing to disregard a sacred trust, mete out
one-sided justice, take the employer side of a labor dispute, and act as a
strike-breaking agency. That, gentlemen, is the reason, the history, and
the necessity of my bill.
Id. at 5478. See also H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1932); 75 CONG.
REC. 5466, 5467, 5468; remarks of Senator Wagner:
Under the blighting effect of the law as it has developed, we have seen the
entire coal industry suffer disorder, violence, disintegration. We have
seen the Federal courts converted into strike-breaking agencies. We have
seen freedom of speech, freedom of association, even the freedom to coop-
erate in refraining from work, smothered under the blanket of injunctions
which now covers the Nation.
Id. at 4915.
dispute" to include "any controversy concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment... regardless of whether or not the dispu-
tants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
einployee." 33
The second line of analysis concerning the NLA reveals that
Congress was well aware that the Act's broad anti-injunction pol-
icy would apply to politically motivated strikes such as the work
stoppage in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals. Representative Beck,34
an opponent of the Act, argued that "the difficulty with [this] bill
is that it takes no account whatever of the motives and purposes
with which a nationwide strike or boycott can be commenced and
prosecuted."35 Accordingly, he proposed an amendment to the
Act which would permit injunctions to enjoin strikes called for ul-
terior purposes. Representative Oliver 36 responded that due to
the oppressive nature of injunctions which had been issued in the
past, federal courts should not have the power to enjoin strikes,
even if the strikes are political in nature.3 7 The House agreed
with Representative Oliver and rejected Representative Beck's
amendment.38 The Supreme Court, recognizing the aforemen-
tioned legislative intent of the Act, has acknowledged that "[t he
Act does not concern itself with the background or the motives of
the dispute."39
The enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, the sec-
33. Norris-La Guardia Act § 13(c) (1976), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) provides in its
entirety:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to ar-
range terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
Id. It is also interesting to note that a narrower definition of the term "labor dis-
pute" was offered as an amendment in the Senate and was rejected on the
grounds that it contained language which was almost exactly the same as the defi-
nition used in § 20 of the Clayton Act. That particular language had been held in
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 471-72 (1921), to apply only to an em-
ployer and his employees. 75 Cong. Rec. 4916 (1932) Id. (remarks of Senator Wag-
ner); see also id. at 4686, where a committee minority agreed that an injunction
should not have been issued in Duplex, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
34. Representative from Pennsylvania.
35. 75 CONG. REC. 5472 (1932).
36. Representative from New York.
37. 75 CONG. REC. at 5480-81 (1932).
38. Amendment offered by Mr. Beck: After the word acts in Section 4, line 5,
page 4, insert the following:
Except where said acts are performed or threatened for an unlawful pur-
pose or with an unlawful intent, or are otherwise in violation of any stat-
ute of the United States.
Id. at 5507. This proposed amendment was not ratified. For relevant portions of
the text of § 4, see supra note 3; Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. at 2683 (1982).
39. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 561 (1937); Jack-
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ond federal policy in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, was mandated
by Congress in 1947 in the LMRA. Congress' primary motive for
enacting the LMRA4O was not to impair the social gains which em-
ployees had received by reason of the NLA, but rather to promote
collective bargaining between labor and management. 41 Once a
collective bargaining agreement had been established between
the parties, section 301 of the LMRA provided federal courts with
jurisdiction over "Is]uits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization." 42 The legislative history of
the LMRA shows that Congress, through the enactment of other
sections, knew how to lift the bar of the NLA when it wished to do
so. The legislative history of section 301, however, shows that
Congress considered and deliberately rejected any repeal of the
political strike provisions of the NLA.43
Section 2(13) of the House bill defined a "sympathy strike" as a
strike which is "conducted not by any reason of any dispute be-
tween the employer and employees . . . but rather by reason of
... disagreement with some governmental policy."" Section
12(a) (3) (A) then termed a sympathy strike as an unlawful con-
certed activity.45 This type of activity was made unlawful and the
sonville Bulk Terminals v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. at 2682
(1982).
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-167, 171-197 (1976).
41. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, at 407, 408 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA]; see Note, Buf-
falo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers: The Supreme Court Sanctions Sympathy
Strikers, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435, 437-38 (1976).
42. See supra note 2. The relevant legislative history of § 301 of the LMRA is
also discussed at length in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 205-209
(1962).
43. See supra note 42. See also, e.g., 29 U.S.C § 160 (prevention of unfair labor
practices), § 178(b) (injunctions during national emergency), § 186(e) (restrictions
of financial transactions).
44. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(13) (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 41 at 168.
Section 2(13) provides in its entirety:
(13) The term "sympathy strike" means a strike against an employer, or
other concerted interference with an employer's operations, which is
called or conducted not by reason or any dispute between the employer
and the employees on strike or participating in such concerted interfer-
ence, but rather by reason or either (a) a dispute involving another em-
ployer or other employees of the same employer, or (b) disagreement
with some governmental policy.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(13) (1947).
45. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 41 at 204, 205.
NLA was made inapplicable in section 302(e) 4 6 of the House bill.
Had the House bill been adopted, it would have made the NLA in-
applicable to suits initiated by private parties to enjoin strike
activity which they deemed in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement. The House Report specifically noted that strikes
"against a policy of national or local government which the em-
ployer cannot change" 47 were recognized as "unlawful concerted
activit[ies]."4 8 Under the House version of the bill, any person in-
jured by such activity could sue the persons responsible, and the
NLA would be inapplicable to such suits. 49 On the other hand,
the Senate bill, while granting federal courts jurisdiction over
suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements, contained no
provision making the NLA inapplicable to such suits. 50 Instead,
the Senate version classified such a breach as an unfair labor
practice,5 1 which like any unfair labor practice, could be enjoined
by a suit initiated by the National Labor Relations Board.52 How-
46. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. § 302(e) (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 41 at 222.
Section 302(e) reads in its entirety:
(e) In actions and proceedings involving violations of agreements be-
tween an employer and a labor organization or other representative of em-
ployees, the provisions of the Act of March 23, 1932, entitled "An Act to
amend the Judicial Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts
sitting in equity and for other purposes," shall not have any application in
respect of either party.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(e) (1947).
47. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 41 at 315.
48. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEG-
IsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 41 at 335.
49. Id. The report reads in pertinent part:
Under this section, these practices are called by their correct name, un-
lawful concerted activites. It is provided that any person injured in his
person, property, or business by an unlawful concerted activity affecting
commerce may sue the person or persons responsible for the injury in any
district court having jurisdiction of the parties and recover damages. The
bill makes inapplicable in such suits the Norris-La Guardia Act, which
heretofore has protected parties to industrial strife from the consequences
of their lawlessness, no matter how violent their disputes become.
Id.
50. Neither the original Senate bill, S. 1126, 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LMRA, supra note 41 at 111-12, nor the amended House bill, H.R. 3020, as
passed by the Senate, 1 NLRB, LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 41
at 279-80, contained a provision similar to § 302(e) of the original House bill. See
supra note 46.
51. 1 NLRB, LEGISLATI'E HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 41 at 111-13, 239,
241-42.
52. National Labor Relations Act § 10(h); 29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1976) expressly
exempts unfair labor practices from the NLA and reads:
(h) When granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order, or
making and entering a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so
modified, or setting aside in whole or in part an order of the Board, as pro-
vided in this section, the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not be
limited by the act entitled An Act to amend the Judicial Code and to de-
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ever, "no provision of the Senate version would have permitted
the issuance of an injunction in a labor dispute at the suit of a pri-
vate party."5 3
The conference committee accepted the Senate version of the
bill which eliminated section 302(e) of the House bill.54 The com-
mittee also rejected the amendment to the Senate version which
made the violation of a collective bargaining agreement an un-
fair labor practice. Instead, the conferees believed suits for
breach of such agreements should remain entirely private and
"be left to the usual processes of the law.155
It seems quite evident that in 1947 Congress refused to adopt a
broad "political motivation" exception to the Norris-La Guardia
Act or to deem breaches of collective bargaining agreements un-
fair labor practices.5 6 The acts must nevertheless be accommo-
dated to each other. It is this process that the Supreme Court has
dealt with through case law analysis.
IV. CASE LAw BACKGROUND
In 1960, the Court decided three cases, known as the steel-
fine and limit the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity, and for other pur-
poses approved March 23, 1932 (U.S.C. Supp. VII, title 29, secs. 101-115)
[NLA]
Id. See supra note 3.
53. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 207 (1962).
54. See supra note 46.
55. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 207 (1962). Citing, H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 41-42 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 41 at 546. The report reads in pertinent part:
The Senate amendment contained a provision which does not appear in
section 8 of existing law. This provision would have made it an unfair la-
bor practice to violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or an
agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration. The conference agree-
ment omits this provision of the Senate amendment. Once parties have
made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract
should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National
Labor Relations Board.
Id.
56. This is the same conclusion that the Supreme Court reached in Jackson-
ville Bulk Terminals. 102 S. Ct. at 2684 (1982). The Court after reaching this con-
clusion continued: [I] nstead if a strike of this nature takes the form of a secondary
boycott prohibited by § 8(b) (of the LMRA), Congress chose to give the [National
Labor Relations] Board, not private parties, the power to petition a federal district
court for an injunction. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (K), 160 (L), Cf. International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n v. Allied International Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1656 (1982). 102 S. Ct. at
2684.
worker's trilogy,5 7 which established the importance and
favorability of the arbitration process. However, in Sinclair Refin-
ing Co. v. Atkinson, 5 8 the Court retreated from this position, or at
least failed to advance the policy, when it ruled that an injunction
to enjoin a strike could not be issued even if the strike constituted
a breach of a collective bargaining agreement.59 The majority, re-
fusing to accommodate section 4 of the NLA with section 301 of
the LMRA, declined to compel specific performance of the "bar-
gained for" no-strike clause. Instead, most of the Court's analysis
centered on whether section 301 of the LMRA impliedly repealed
section 4 of the NLA.60
The real significance of the Sinclair decision, however, lay in
the dissent. Justice Brennan recognized that accommodation of
the two provisions was imperative, particularly where the dispute
fell within the arbitration scheme of a collective agreement.61 Jus-
tice Brennan neither lost sight of the important role that the NLA
plays in labor policy, nor did he contend that the "jurisdictional
grant to federal courts in section 301 to enforce collective bargain-
ing agreements was broader than the jurisdictional denial to fed-
eral courts in Norris-La Guardia to enjoin labor disputes." 62
In order to accommodate the anti-injunction policies of the NLA
with the purposes of section 301 of the LMRA, Justice Brennan
57. See supra note 9. In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960), the Court noted:
[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied un-
less it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
Id. at 582-83.
58. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
59. Id. at 209. The union had signed an agreement which contained a no-strike
clause "for any cause which is or may be the subject of a grievance." The union
then proceeded to strike over grievances which could have been submitted to arbi-
tration. The district court dismissed the complaint. This action was affirmed by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which felt the case, as a labor dispute, fell
within the purview of Norris-La Guardia. Id. at 197-200.
60. See supra notes 26-55 and accompanying text.
61. 370 U.S. 195, 216-217. Justice Brennan noted:
But the enjoining of a strike over an arbitrable grievance may be indis-
pensable to the effective enforcement of an arbitration scheme in a collec-
tive agreement; thus the power to grant that injunctive remedy may be
essential to the uncrippled performance of the Court's function under
§ 301.
Id. at 216-17 (footnote omitted).
62. See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 225 (1962). Justice Brennan
noted:
[T]here is no general federal anti-strike policy; and although a suit may
be brought under § 301 against strikes which, while they are breaches of
private contracts, do not threaten any additional public policy, in such
cases the anti-injunction policy of Norris-La Guardia should prevail.
Id. at 225.
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would allow the issuance of an injunction when the federal courts
found that four requirements were fulifiled: 1.) injunctive relief
must be appropriate despite the NLA; 2.) the strike or work stop-
page must entail a grievance which both parties are contractually
bound to arbitrate under a collective bargaining agreement; 3.)
conditional upon the issuance of an injunction the employer must
submit the grievance to arbitration; and 4.) the district court must
determine if the injunction would be warranted under ordinary
principles of equity.6 3
There were two distinct reasons why the Supreme Court felt
that the Sinclair decision should be reconsidered. First, the deci-
sion was an extreme departure from the Court's prior emphasis
and the established congressional policy, favoring the peaceful
settlement of labor disputes through arbitration.64 Second, the
practical effect of Sinclair, when read in conjunction with the
prior decision of the Court in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,65
was to "oust state courts of jurisdiction in section 301(a) suits
where injunctive relief [was] sought for breach of a no-strike
obligation."66
63. Since Justice Brennan's passage is relied upon by the Court to establish
the Boys Markets exception, it is reproduced in full:
A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant injunc-
tive relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the
case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate despite the Nor-
ris-La Guardia Act. When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is
over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate,
the District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds that the
contract does have that effect; and the employer should be ordered to arbi-
trate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike. Be-
yond this, the District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of
an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity -
whether breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been
threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause
irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer
more from the denial of an injunction than will the union from its
issuance.
370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (emphasis in original).
64. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241
(1970); See also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
65. 390 U.S. 557 (1968). The Court held that unions could remove state court
suits brought under § 301(a) of the LMRA to federal court pursuant to the federal
question removal jurisdiction enunciated in 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). Once the suit
was removed, the unions obtained the advantage of the Sinclair decision, and any
injunctive relief would be dissolved by the federal court.
66. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 244-
45; Note, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steel Workers: The Supreme Court Sanctions
Sympathy Strikes, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435, 439 (1976).
The chance for reconsideration came in Boys Markets. 67 The
Court, in overruling Sinclair, held that where the controversy
concerned a matter which the parties had agreed to arbitrate, fed-
eral courts could enjoin work stoppages and require arbitration of
the dispute.68 The district courts, in their determinations of
whether or not to grant injunctive relief, were instructed to follow
the principles enumerated in Justice Brennan's dissent in
Sinclair. 69
The Court not only specifically recognized that Boys Markets
was a "narrow" exception, but also that the decision in no way
"undermine[d] the vitality of the Norris-La Guardia Act.' 70 The
Court continued:
We deal only with the situation in which a collective-bargaining contract
contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure. Nor
does it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate
as a matter of course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable
grievance.
7 1
The purpose of a Boys Markets injunction is not to compel
specific performance of some substantive provision of a collective
bargaining agreement. The NLA explictly prohibits such relief.
Rather, the purpose is to protect and promote the arbitration pro-
cess by enforcing the union's bargained for pledge to arbitrate in-
stead of strike over the substantive issue. It necessarily "follows
that there can be no Boys Markets exception to Norris-LaGuardia
unless the dispute over Which the union is striking is one that it
has agreed to submit to arbitration."72
Because the courts of appeals were divided on the issue of
whether a grievance which the union had not agreed to arbitrate
was enjoinable,7 3 the Supreme Court reestablished the appropri-
67. 398 U.S. 235 (1970). The parties' collective bargaining agreement provided
that all controversies concerning the interpretation of the agreement would be re-
solved through the arbitration process. The agreement also contained a no-strike
clause. The union picketed over an interpretation of the contract which clearly fell
within the ambient of the arbitration agreement.
68. 398 U.S. 235, 254. The only injunction at issue in this case, and also in Sin-
clair, Buffalo Forge, and Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, was one granted prior to ar-
bitration. It has been consistently recognized that once the arbitrator has ruled,
federal courts may enforce his decision without the prohibitions of the Norris-La
Guardia Act. See Brief for Respondents at 14, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. In-
ternational Longshoremen's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982). Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 405 (1976); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
69. 398 U.S. 235, 254; See supra note 62.
70. 398 U.S. at 253-54.
71. Id.
72. Brief for Respondent at 15, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982) (emphasis in original).
73. The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits held that no injunction could issue
unless the underlying dispute fell within the arbitration clause. The Third, Fourth,
and Eighth Circuits believed that even if the underlying dispute was not arbitra-
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ateness of the NLA ban on injunctions in Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers.74 The prayer for injunctive relief arose
when the United Steelworkers, honoring a sister union's picket
lines, engaged in a work stoppage. The Steelworkers' employ-
ment contract contained a no-strike clause as well as arbitration
provisions for settling disputes which concerned the interpreta-
tion or application of the contract.75
The Court held that an injunction could not be issued to enjoin
the sympathy strike pending an arbitrator's determination of
whether the strike violated the express no-strike clause contained
in the collective bargaining agreement. The majority held that
Boys Markets did not control the sympathy strike situation be-
cause the underlying dispute was nonarbitrable. 76 Furthermore,
the rationale behind the granting of a Boys Markets injunction
was absent because the sister union's controversy was not subject
to the Steelworkers' settlement procedures, thus the employer
was not deprived of anything for which he had bargained.77
The Court also recognized a second dispute engendered by the
first-whether the union work stoppage, in response to the nonar-
bitrable dispute, violated the no-strike provision of the collective
bargaining agreement. Concededly, this issue was arbitrable and
the employer would be entitled to an order requiring the union to
arbitrate. However, under the prohibitions of section 4(a) of the
NLA,78 the district court is not empowered to enjoin the strike
pending the decision of the arbitrator.79
ble, the issue of a violation of the no-strike clause was an arbitrable difference
which permitted the issuance of an injunction under the Boys Markets rationale.
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 404 n.9 (1976).
74. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
75. Id. at 399-400.
76. Justice White, writing for the majority noted:
Boys Markets plainly does not control this case. The District Court found,
and it is not now disputed, that the strike was not over any dispute be-
tween the Union and the employer that was even remotely subject to the
arbitration provisions of the contract. The strike at issue was a sympathy
strike in support of sister unions negotiating with the employer .... The
strike had neither the purpose nor the effect of denying or evading an obli-
gation to arbitrate or of depriving the employer of its bargain.
428 U.S. at 407, 408 (footnote omitted).
77. Id.
78. See supra note 3.
79. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 410, 411
(1976). Justice White noted:
If an injunction could issue against the strike in this case, so in proper cir-
cumstances could a court enjoin any other alleged breach of contract
In summary, the Boys Markets exception allows a pre-arbitra-
tion injunction because the union has elected to strike over,
rather than arbitrate, a matter which is explicitly contained in the
collective-bargaining agreement. In situations synonymous to
that in Buffalo Forge, the dispute precipitating the strike is not
whether the no-strike clause is being violated but rather some de-
tached issue which is not encompassed by the collective bargain-
ing agreement. In this respect, the dispute is not over an
arbitrable issue and this falls outside the ambient of the Boys
Markets exception.80
The question which was left open after Buffalo Forge was the
extent to which the Court would determine that specific types of
work stoppages were not arbitrable. Employers realized that
sympathy strikes, unless contained in the collective bargaining
agreements' arbitration provisions, were not enjoinable under
section 301 of the LMRA. They were to become aware that work
stoppages motivated by political goals were also not enjoinable in
federal court.
V. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, initially noted that in
specific situations, exceptions to the NLA's broad anti-injunction
provisions have been recognized.8 1 For instance, in Boys Markets
it became necessary to accommodate section 301(a) of the LMRA
to the anti-injunction policies of Norris-La Guardia.82 This accom-
modation, to specific federal legislation or established congres-
pending the exhaustion of the applicable grievance and arbitration provi-
sions even though the injunction would otherwise violate one of the ex-
press prohibitions of section 4 [of the Norris-La Guardia Act].
Id. at 410.
80. Consequently, after Buffalo Forge, the courts of appeals have been unani-
mous in holding that, where the underlying dispute over which the union is strik-
ing is not arbitrable, a preliminary injunction may not be granted prior to
arbitration of the issue of whether the no-strike clause has been violated. Brief for
Respondent at 17, n.17, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982). Waller Brothers Stone Co. v. United
Steelworkers, AFL-CIO, 620 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1980); Jacksonville Maritime Ass'n,
Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 571 F.2d 319, 325 (5th Cir.
1978); J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 598, 568 F.2d 1292,
1295 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162, 169 (1st Cir. 1977); Cor-
porate Printing Co. v. New York Tel. Union Number 6, 555 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1977);
Cedar Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers, 560 F.2d 1153, 1169 (4th Cir. 1977); National
Rejectors Indus. v. United Steelworkers of America, 562 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir.
1977); Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1341 (3rd Cir. 1976);
NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co., 538 F.2d 1291, 1295 (7th Cir. 1976).
81. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 249-53 (1970); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chi-
cago River and Indiana R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 39-42 (1957).
82. 398 U.S. at 244-55.
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sional policy, determines the situations where the NLA does not
apply, and federal courts may enjoin union activity. However, as
Justice Marshall pointed out, where the union activity entails a
dispute which is not arbitrable, the need to accommodate the two
acts becomes evanescent.8 3 Union activity, strike, boycott, or
work stoppage, so long as it is called over a non-arbitrable dis-
pute, does not directly frustrate the arbitration process. Unlike
the situation in Boys Markets, such activity is not an attempt to
evade the obligation to arbitrate grievances mentioned in the col-
lective bargaining agreement.8 4
The first issue addressed by the majority85 was whether the
work stoppage could be defined as a "case involving or growing
83. 102 S. Ct. at 2686.
84. 102 S. Ct. at 2679 n.8 (1982); see Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,
428 U.S. 397, 407-12 (1976).
85. Neither the majority nor the dissent dealt with two specific issues which
were advanced in the Circuit Court of Appeals. The first issue was whether the
case had become moot since the union employees had returned to work and
loaded the Norwegian vessels. The Supreme Court does give this problem cursory
attention:
Although the work stoppage is no longer in effect, there remains a live
controversy over whether the collective bargaining agreement prohibits
politically motivated work stoppages, and the Union may resume such a
work stoppage at any time. As a result, this case is not moot.
102 S. Ct. at 2677 n.1. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397,
403 n.8 (1976).
However, the Fifth Circuit addressed the problem more fully by maintaining
several lines of analysis. If it is probable that similar cases will arise in -the same
fashion in the future and the underlying dispute will, as a result of similar occur-
rences, evade judicial review, there is sufficient case law to satisfy the constitu-
tional requirement. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911). However, if the case is not presented as a class
action, mootness can be avoided only if the challenged action is in duration too
short to be litigated fully prior to its cessation or expiration and there is a reason-
able expectation that the same complaining party would again be subjected to the
same action. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975).
The second issue which the Supreme Court did not directly address in Jackson-
ville Bulk Terminal was the first amendment argument made by the ILA in the
Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit maintained:
The agreement that the injunction against the refusal to work ships is a
"prior restraint" on speech does not withstand analysis. Neither Presi-
dent Gleason [of the ILA] nor any other ILA officer or member is en-joined from speaking. They are enjoined simply from continuing a work
stoppage....
Id. at 463. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court in a case decided
in April of 1982 did address this specific issue. That case also arose out of the
ILA's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. See International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1656, 1664-65 (1982).
out of [a] labor dispute" within the meaning of section 4 of the
NLA.86 "Labor dispute" is defined in Section 13(c) of the Act as
including "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of em-
ployment."87 In most situations, however, where an employer
brings suit to enforce a no-strike provision of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, there are two controversies involved. First, the
"underlying dispute" which precipitated the strike or work stop-
page, and second, whether the work stoppage violates the no-
strike agreement between the parties.88 It is this second contro-
versy-whether the union may refuse to perform certain work
under the collective bargaining agreement-that gives rise to fed-
eral court jurisdiction under section 301 of the LMRA.89 "[Ilt is
beyond [objection] that [the] second form of dispute . . is a
'controversy concerning the terms or conditions of employment'
[within the explicit language of section 13(c) of the Norris-La
Guardia Act] .90
The employer, however, argued that the political motivation be-
hind the work stoppage removed this case from the broad defini-
tion of "labor disputes." The Court initially established that the
specific language of the Act makes no exception for labor disputes
which are politically motivated 9' and then continued:
Nor is there any basis in the statutory language for the argument that the
Act requires that each dispute relevant to the case be a labor dispute. The
Act merely requires that the case involve 'any' labor dispute. Therefore,
the plain terms of § 4(a) and § 13 of the Norris-La Guardia Act deprives
the federal courts of the power to enjoin the Union's work stoppage in this
§ 301 action, without regard to whether the Union also has a non-labor dis-
pute with another entity.9 2
The legislative history of the NLA also supports the conclusion
that strikes motivated by political goals are not exempt from the
Act's broad anti-injunction provisions.93 Even when Congress
had the opportunity to repeal the Act with respect to labor dis-
putes having their genesis in the political arena, it refused to do
s0.94 That opportunity arose when Congress enacted the LMRA.
86. See supra note 3 for the entire text of the act.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976); see supra note 17 for the entire text.
88. 102 S. Ct. at 2680.
89. Recall that section 301 (a) of the LMRA allows federal court jurisdiction in
[s] uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization."
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976); See supra note 2 for the entire text.
90. 102 S. Ct. at 2680.
91. Id.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 2682; see also supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text;.particularly
the comments of Representatives Beck and Oliver, supra notes 35 and 37.
94. 102 S. Ct. at 2683-84; see also supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text, par-
ticularly section 2(13) of the original House version of the LMRA, H.R. 3020, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(13) (1947), reprinted in 1, NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, supra note 41, at 168.
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The Court concluded that neither the statutory language nor the
legislative history of the two Acts exempted the type of labor dis-
pute involved, from the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-La
Guardia.95 This being the case, it remained to be determined
whether their inclusion would be inconsistent with prior case law
interpreting the Act.
It has traditionally been the policy of the Court to interpret the
NLA broadly,96 since Congress "was intent upon taking the fed-
eral courts out of labor injunction business." 97 Second, the
Supreme Court, in Columbia River Packers Association v.
Hinton, 98 maintained that a critical element in determining the
applicability of the NLA was whether the controversy involved an
employer-employee relationship.99 The Court, in Jacksonville
Bulk Terminals, recognized that the employer and the union were
the disputants and the controversy involved the collective bar-
gaining agreement into which they entered. 0 0 Thus, the critical
element that the employer-employee relationship be the matrix of
the controversy was satisfied01
The employer advanced the argument that "a 'labor dispute' ex-
ists only when the union's action is taken in its own economic
95. 102 S. Ct. at 2687, 2680-81.
96. Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama SS Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 (1960). "This
congressional purpose ... was prompted by a desire to protect the rights of labor-
ing men to organize and bargain collectively and to withdraw federal courts from a
type of controversy for which many believed they were ill-suited and from partici-
pation in which, it was feared, judicial prestige might suffer." Id. at 369 n.7.
97. 315 U.S. 143 (1942).
98. Id. at 146-47. The Court used the following language:
We recognized that by the terms of the statute there may be a "labor dis-
pute" where the disputants do not stand in the proximate relation of em-
ployer and employee. But the statutory classification, however broad, of
parties and circumstances to which a "labor dispute" may relate does not
expand the application of the [Norris-La Guardia] Act to include contro-
versies upon which the employer-employee relationship has no bearing.
Id.
99. 102 S. Ct. at 2681.
100. In delineating the relationship requirements, the Court suggests:
A labor dispute might be present under the facts of this case even in the
absence of the dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause. Regardless
of the political nature of the union's objections to handling Soviet-bound
cargo, these objections were expressed in a work stoppage by emplyees
against their employer, which focused on particular work assignments.
Thus apart from the collective-bargaining agreement, the employer-em-
ployee relationship would be the matrix of the controversy.
Id. at 2681 n.12.
101. Id. at 2681.
self-interest." 0 2 The Court not only rejected this argument as
having no support in prior case law,103 but also suggested that it
had been well established that "terms or conditions of employ-
ment" entails something broader than wages, hours, unionization
or betterment of working conditions. 04 The Court took specific
notice of the fact that the NLA "does not concern itself with the
background or motives of the dispute."'o 5
In sum, the Jacksonville Bulk Terminals Court held that the
NLA did not exempt politically motivated work stoppages, either
in specific statutory language or historical analysis, from its broad
anti-injunction language. Furthermore, prior decisions of federal
courts established that the anti-injunction policies should apply
to politically motivated strikes.0 6 In any case, the dispute con-
cerning the extent and possible violation of the no-strike agree-
ment is definitely a "labor dispute" within the meaning of Norris-
La Guardia and, absent exemption from the Act, an injunction
102. Id. The employer's reliance was based on several cases. American Fed'n
of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968); Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton,
315 U.S. 143 (1942); Bakery Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948). These
cases, however, were concerned with the different issue of whether a "labor
group" existed for the purposes of anti-trust laws. These cases did not establish
that a "labor dispute" must entail purely economic motives, 102 S. Ct. at 2681 n.3.
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976), supra note 33.
104. 102 S. Ct. at 2682. The Court pointed out that if the employer's economic
motive argument were given credence, strikes in protest of unreasonably unsafe
conditions and many sympathy strikes would fall outside the ambient of "labor
disputes." Id. at 2682 n.14; see also Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) (Federal Court prohibited from issuing injunction
against sympathy strike in support of a sister union because sympathy strike was
not an arbitrable grievance and hence not within Boys Markets exception to NLA);
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938) (pickteting by as-
sociation of blacks because of store's hiring policies constitutes labor dispute
within provisions of NLA).
105. 102 S. Ct. at 2682 (quoting New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303
U.S. 552, 561 (1938); see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
106. See United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th
Cir. 1975), rehearing denied, 526 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976);
see supra note 22; Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975) (where union's grievance which precipi-
tated strike concerned state and federal regulations on allocation, distribution and
sale of gasoline).
In addition, referrence may be made to the following cases which, like the Jack-
sonville Bulk Terminals case, arose out of the ILA's response to the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan: Hampton Roads Shippings Ass'n v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 631 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1980); New Orleans Steamship Ass'n
v. General Longshore Workers, International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 468 F. Supp.
409 (1980) (consolidated with Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980); John W. McGrath Corp. v. At-
lantic Coast District, International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 80-CV-150 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar 6, 1980) (This unreported opinion is reproduced as an Appendix to Brief for
Respondents, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982).
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cannot be issued prior to an arbitration finding.107
With this established, the Court faced the issue of whether or
not the boycott could still be enjoined under the rationale of Boys
Markets. 108 The Court took notice that:
The rationale of Buffalo Forge compels the conclusion that the Union's
work stoppage, called to protest the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet
Union, may not be enjoined pending the arbitrator's decision on whether
the work stoppage violates the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining
agreement. The underlying dispute, whether viewed as an expression of
the Union's "'moral outrage'" at Soviet military policy or as an expres-
sion of sympathy for the people of Afghanistan, is plainly not arbitrable
under the collective-bargaining agreement." 10 9
The underlying dispute, the controversy which precipitated the
work stoppage, is not arbitrable and, therefore, does not directly
frustrate the arbitration process. The issue of whether the boy-
cott violates the no-strike agreement is an issue which an arbitra-
tor, not the federal courts,110 should resolve.'
VI. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Chief Justice Burger, writing in dissent, felt that as a political
dispute, the controversy in this case had no relation to a "contro-
versy concerning terms or conditions of employment .... 1112 He
relied on two cases for the proposition that federal courts had
107. See supra note 3.
108. See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of
the Boys Markets exception. Note also that for the employer to advance this argu-
ment he had to discard his prior argument that the dispute was purely political,
and argue alternatively that the dispute is enjoinable because it is arbitrable
under the collective bargaining agreement. 102 S. Ct. at 2685.
109. 102 S. Ct. at 2685.
110. The Court in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S.
397 (1976) noted:
It is incredible to believe that the courts would always view the facts and
the contract as the arbitrator would; and it is difficult to believe that the
arbitrator would not be heavily influenced or wholly preempted by judicial
views of the facts .... Injunctions very often permanently settle the is-
sue; and in other contexts time and expense would be discouraging fac-
tors to the losing party in court in considering whether to relitigate ...
before the arbitrator.
Id at 412.
111. Justice O'Connor writing a separate concurring opinion states: "[N]o in-
junction may issue pending arbitration because, the underlying political dispute is
not arbitrable under the collecting bargaining agreement. Unless the Court is will-
ing to overrule Buffalo Forge, the conclusion reached by the Court in this case is
inescapable." 102 S. Ct. at 2687.
112. Id. at 2687 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting § 13(c) of the Norris-La
Guardia Act); see supra note 17 for the full text of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
§ 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976).
consistently recognized the applicability of the NLA only to eco-
nomic disputes.1 3 The first case, Khedival Line, S.A.E. v. Seafar-
ers International Union114 was not initiated under the auspices of
section 301 of the LMRA. Rather, a foreign shipowner sought to
enjoin the picketing union by invoking the court's admiralty juris-
diction.1 5 The second case relied upon by the Chief Justice, West
Gulf Maritime Association v. International Longshoremen's Asso-
ciation, 116 was expressly renounced by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in its Jacksonville Bulk Terminals decision." 7 The Fifth
Circuit has adhered to the rationale of United States Steel Corp. v.
United Mine Workers, 118 finding it more persuasive. Furthermore,
West Gulf Maritime Association has been thoroughly discredited
by the Buffalo Forge opinion." 9 In short, the cases which Chief
Justice Burger relied upon are not "on point."
The Chief Justice also suggested that if Congress had intended
to bar the federal courts from issuing injunctions in political dis-
putes, the definition of a "labor dispute" in section 13(c) of the
NLA would not be limited to "terms or conditions of employ-
ment."' 20 However, this argument does not seem to withstand an
analysis of the legislative history of the Act.121 Chief Justice Bur-
ger advocated that the reason Congress refused to amend the
LMRA in 1947 to exempt politically motivated disputes from the
NLA122 was because the amendments were too broad in scope.123
However, if Congress had intended for the LMRA to limit section
4 of the NLA it could have done so. Instead, all such amendments
were deleted from the final version of the LMRA.124
Finally, the Chief Justice, finding no way to reconcile the major-
113. 102 S. Ct at 2688 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
114. 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960). See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 50-51. The main distinction in the case is that the suit was not
brought by the employer, but by a foreign shipowner. See Brief for Respondents
at 12-13, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982).
116. 413 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex. 1975), affd summarily, 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.
1976).
117. 626 F.2d 455, 464-65 (1980); see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
118. 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), rehearing denied, 526 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976) (finding strike to achieve a political goal a labor
dispute within the meaning of the NLA).
119. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976); see supra
notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
120. 102 S. Ct. at 2687 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also supra note 17 (narrow
definition of term "labor dispute" was offerred as an amendment in the Senate
and rejected).
121. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text discussing Congress' refusal
to adopt broad political motivation exception to the NLA.
123. 102 S. Ct. at 2688 n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
124. See supra notes 54-55.
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ity opinion with International Longshoremen's Association v. Al-
lied International, Inc.,125 suggested that Buffalo Forge be
overruled. 126 Allied International arose out of the same nucleus
of facts as did the Jacksonville Bulk Terminals case, which was
the International Longshoremen's Association's protest over the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Allied International, the Court
held that the union's refusal to unload wood products from the
Soviet Union was a secondary boycott in violation of section
8(b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act (Taft-Hartley). 27 The
Union was therefore liable for damages under section 303 of the
LMRA.128 It must be remembered, however, that Allied Interna-
tional was not brought under section 301 of the LMRA.129
The Jacksonville Bulk Terminals case is quite similar to the
Fifth Circuit case of United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine
Workers of America. 130 Although an injunction may not be issued
under a section 301 suit, the employer is not precluded from pur-
suing other possible remedies. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc.
may still initiate a suit under section 303 of the LMRA and, upon
a showing of unfair labor practices in violation of the secondary
boycott proscriptions of section 8(b) (4) of the LMRA, recover
damages.' 3 1
Justice Powell 32 felt that the Buffalo Forge decision was an
125. 102 S. Ct. 1656 (1982).
126. 102 S. Ct. at 2689 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
127. 102 S. Ct. at 1663. The violation of the National Labor Relations Act
§ 8(b) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1976), was resultant of the facts that the union's
activity was considered "in commerce" and a secondary boycott. Id. at 1662-63.
The Court refused to apply a political boycott exception to the secondary boycott
provision. Id. at 1664.
128. Labor Management Relations Act § 303 (1976), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976), pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry
or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any
activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 158(b) (4)
of this title. (b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by
reason (of) any violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue there-
fore in any district court of the United States ... and shall recover the
damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.
Id.
129. See supra note 55.
130. 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), rehearing denied, 526 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976). See supra note 22.
131. Id. at 1247 n.23.
132. Justice Powell concurred in Chief Justice Burger's dissent and also wrote
a separate dissent. Justice Powell also wrote the majority opinion in the Allied
Int'l. case.
"aberration" and should be overruled.133 He maintained that di-
viding the dispute into two separate controversies was contradic-
tory. On the one hand, the boycott must be characterized as a
labor dispute involving the scope of the no-strike clause in order
to bring the dispute within the breadth of the NLA. But on the
other hand, Buffalo Forge requires the finding that the dispute is
really over Soviet aggression and therefore not arbitrable.134 The
majority opinion, however, found that the politically motivated
work stoppage was a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the
NLA.135 Buffalo Forge does not require a change in this finding, it
simply requires that the controversy, i.e., the labor dispute, politi-
cally motivated or not, be arbitrable.136
Justice Stevens concurred with the dissent of the Chief Justice
to the extent his analysis did not include the Allied International
decision. He also dissented for reasons advanced by him in the
Buffalo Forge case.' 37 His dissent in that case analyzed the legis-
lative history of the LMRA.138 The majority in Jacksonville Bulk
Terminals found that Congress rejected any type of political ex-
emption from the NLA when the LMRA was enacted. 39
VII. IMPACT
The Jacksonville Bulk Terminals decision was a tremendous
victory for organized labor. The decision not only reestablished
support for the Buffalo Forge decision, but also broadened the
contemporary interpretation of section 4 of the NLA. In this re-
gard, political motivation does not exempt the federal judiciary
from adherance to the broad anti-injunction provisions of the Act.
The work stoppage in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals was precipi-
tated by political factors which were quite extensive. An ex-
tremely large organized union, the International Longshoremen's
Association, decided en masse to protest the aggression of the So-
viet Union. It will be interesting to note how closely the decision
is followed under more narrow factual situations.
The employer is left in the precarious position of possessing a
133. 102 S. Ct. at 2690 (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2680.
136. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
137. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 420-21
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (federal court may enjoin sympathy strike which
violates no-strike clause).
138. Essential to this case with regard to the legislative history was the fact
that Congress placed importance on making collective bargaining agreements
equally binding and enforceable on both parties.
139. 102 S. Ct. at 2983. An amendment that would have allowed federal courts
to enjoin strikes called for ulterior motive was defeated. 75 CONG. REc. 5507 (1932).
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bargained for, unequivocal no-strike clause (a clause for which he
gave something in exchange) which is practically useless when
he tries to enjoin strike activity. The clause does become impor-
tant when the employer attempts to obtain damages under sec-
tion 303 of the LMRA.
Under a situation where the underlying dispute is neither arbi-
trable nor contemplated by the parties when they established
their collective bargaining agreement, federal courts may not is-
sue injuctions. This much is clear from Jacksonville Bulk Termi-
nals. To hold otherwise would usurp the arbitrator's authority,
authority which was given to him by the parties through their
own agreement. If federal courts were allowed to freely issue in-
juctions in all situations in which they felt the union employees
were at fault, or in violation of the no-strike agreement, organized
labor would soon occupy the position it did before the Norris-La
Guardia Act.
MARK A. OZZELLO

